<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Dns on Aretiq AI</title><link>https://aretiq.ai/tags/dns/</link><description>Recent content in Dns on Aretiq AI</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://aretiq.ai/tags/dns/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>CVE-2026-3593 — ISC BIND 9 DNS-over-HTTPS HTTP/2 SETTINGS Use-After-Free</title><link>https://aretiq.ai/research/vul260605-cve-2026-3593-isc-bind-9-dns-over-https-http2-settings-use-after-free/</link><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://aretiq.ai/research/vul260605-cve-2026-3593-isc-bind-9-dns-over-https-http2-settings-use-after-free/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="1-overview">1. Overview&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>A use-after-free vulnerability exists in ISC BIND 9&amp;rsquo;s DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) implementation. When a DoH response has been sent, the response buffer is freed but a dangling pointer (&lt;code>socket-&amp;gt;h2-&amp;gt;wbuf&lt;/code>) is left pointing to the freed memory. If a client floods HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames that change &lt;code>INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE&lt;/code>, the nghttp2 library re-evaluates stream flow control and calls the data provider callback (&lt;code>server_read_callback&lt;/code>), which reads from the freed buffer via &lt;code>memmove()&lt;/code>. The UAF read is confirmed by AddressSanitizer and reliably crashes ASAN-instrumented builds (~40% per round). Against production BIND builds using jemalloc, the freed memory remains mapped and the read succeeds silently — the server does not crash. Information disclosure via the HTTP/2 DATA stream was not confirmed: although &lt;code>server_read_callback&lt;/code> reads freed heap bytes, nghttp2 discards the result because the stream&amp;rsquo;s data provider had already signaled EOF; no extra bytes are transmitted to the attacker. The practical impact is therefore denial of service against hardened builds, and a latent memory safety violation in production that could become exploitable if nghttp2&amp;rsquo;s internal handling changes. ISC addressed this vulnerability in BIND 9.20.23 and 9.21.22.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>